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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: CONTENT,
PROSPECTS AND COMPARISONS TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
Charles R. McGuire, J.D.t
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 29, 2004, atop Capitoline Hill, once the center of the Roman
Empire,1 European heads of government signed the European Union's (EU) first
constitution. In the United States, the moment was anticlimactic and largely lost
to audiences focused on the American presidential election. 2 In Europe, the
signing represented fifty years of history and much hard negotiating over the
past thirty months.
The European Constitution is an extraordinary document, not just for what
it says, but for its very existence. To those steeped in the recent history of
Europe, including two world wars and the Cold War, ethnic distrust, ancient
feuds, and hardened nationalism, the notion of a united Europe seems an
impossible fantasy. A united Europe was the dream of every would-be European
conqueror, from Charlemagne to Napoleon to Hitler, but their dreams would
have unified the continent by empire and force. This time, Europe may be united
by diplomacy and mutual interest.
t Chairperson and Professor Department of Finance, Insurance and Law Illinois State University.
1. The choice of Rome was symbolic. Rome was not only the center of the first attempt at
European unity over two thousand years ago, it "was also the site of the 1957 birth of the European
Economic Community" in the Treaty of Rome. Daniel Williams, European Leaders Sign
Constitution; Prospectsfor Ratification Uncertain, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2004, at A15.
2. See generally Graham Bowley, Heads of State Sign the European Union's First Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A3. Cf. Dan Bilefsky & Gabriel Kahn, EU Standoff on Leadership
Shadows Signing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2004, at A13 (Note that the placement may be
significant.).
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While largely ignored by the U.S. media, public, and policy makers, the
prospect of a united Europe has massive implications, not all of them positive,
for American international policies. A politically unified Europe will necessarily
provide a counterweight and a competitor to American power in the international
arena. Europe now has an economy nearly as large as that of the United States, a
population significantly greater than that of the United States, a currency that
rivals the dollar at the international unit of exchange, and a workforce in many
ways as modem and sophisticated as their American counterparts.
As Europe's wealth, military capacity, and collective character increase, so
will its appetite for greater international influence. Just as America's will to
extend its primacy stems not just from self-interest, but also from an emotional
satisfaction derived from its leadership position - call it nationalism - so will
Europe's rise inspire a yearning for greater status. As the United States currently
sits atop the international pecking order, the EU's search for greater autonomy
and status will, at least initially, take the form of resisting U.S. influence and
ending its long decades of deference to Washington.
3
The Draft Constitution for Europe was first presented by the European
Convention on July 18, 2003. This Constitution (more precisely the Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe) was under consideration by the European
Convention since February of 2002. On December 13, 2003, the leaders of the
twenty-five current and prospective members of the European Union failed to
reach agreement on the Constitution, and at least for a time the constitutional
process was stalled.4 The chief issue was the definition of a "qualified majority
vote" (QMV), the relative weighting of the votes of Member States needed to
pass certain legislation. That issue was resolved in a meeting in Brussels on
June 18, 2004.
The Constitution now moves to a two year process of ratification.
Ratification must be unanimous among the twenty-five members of the EU, and
the internal process of ratification is to be decided by each country. At least
eleven of the members have indicated that they will hold a referendum, 5 while
3. CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, THE END OF THE AMERICAN ERA: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
GEOPOLITICS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 154 (2002).
4. John Tagliabue, European Union Can't Reach Deal on Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2003, at 1. 1 (explaining that the reason for the inability to reach a deal was the voting formula in
the Constitution between the large and small Member States, an issue reminiscent of the Great
Compromise in the U.S. Constitution. In this instance, Spain and Poland wanted almost as much
voting power as much larger states, while Germany and France did not want to share power to that
degree).
5. The European Union Constitution: The Constitution Ratification, CITIZENSHIP AND
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IN EUROPE (CIDEL), at
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucionlTreaties/Treaty-ConstRat.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005)
(explaining that the members include Belgium (non-binding consultative referendum), the Czech
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three will subject the Constitution to a parliamentary vote.6  A significant
number are undecided about the nature of the procedure to be used for
ratification.
7
The combined requirements of unanimous ratification and individualized
ratification procedures make it highly unlikely that the constitution will indeed
be ratified within the two years provided, if at all. However, the very idea of a
European Constitution and the fact that it has proceeded this far shakes the
popular American vision of a contentious and ineffective Europe. In fact, the
notion of a federal Europe as a potential rival and competitor may give pause to
American policy makers.
8
In many ways the European Constitution merely formalizes existing
practice within the European Union and incorporates within one document all of
the treaties and compacts that have governed Europe for the past several
decades. The creation of the Constitution clearly solidifies the federalization of
Europe following a remarkable half-century that saw the creation of the
European Community, the recent adoption of the euro by much of the continent,
and the accession of former communist states into the EU itself. It is part of a
Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and
the United Kingdom).
6. Id. (noting that the three are Estonia, Germany, and Sweden).
7. Id. (noting that these are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia).
8. Melissa Rossi & Christopher Dickey, The 'Awkward' Squad, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2003, at
28. The fears may be justified. A united Europe may well present a significant rival to the United
States, economically and perhaps politically.
The EU's annual economic output has reached about $8 trillion, compared with
America's $10 trillion, and the euro will soon threaten the dollar's global
dominance. Europe is strengthening its collective consciousness and character
and forging a clearer sense of interests and values that are quite distinct from
those of the United States. The EU's member states are debating the adoption of
a Europe-wide constitution... building armed forces capable of operating
independently of the U.S. military, and striving to project a single voice in the
diplomatic arena. As the EU fortifies its governmental institutions and takes in
new members ... it will become a formidable counterweight to the United
States on the world stage. The transatlantic rivalry that has already begun will
inevitably intensify. Centers of power by their nature compete for position,
influence, and prestige.
For the moment America remains largely oblivious to the challenges posed by a
rising Europe. Policymakers in Washington tend to view the EU as at best an
impressive trade bloc, and at worst a collection of feckless allies .... That the
EU and the United States might part ways would seem to border on the
unthinkable. These presumptions are dangerous illusions.
Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the West, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2002, at 42.
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process that now seems inexorably moving toward political union, albeit at a
slow and grinding pace.9
The American constitutional experience has deeply influenced the
European constitutional process. Former French President Valerie Giscard
d'Estaing, Chairman of the Constitutional Convention, carried a copy of David
McCullough's best selling biography of John Adams on vacation with him.
Europe's leaders have even considered a bicameral legislature similar to the1 0
American Senate and House of Representatives. Certainly the EU
Constitution, once adopted, will be compared to the American Constitution in
both its successes and its failures. Once the European Constitution is enacted,
European judges and lawyers are likely to look to the American constitutional
experience and American constitutional law for guidance, support, and judicial
gloss.
The purpose of this article is threefold. First, it is to lay out the foundations
for a discussion of the European Constitution, including a brief discussion of the
background and history of the "federalization" of Europe and an overview of the
document itself. Second, for American audiences, it is important to consider the
European Constitution in the context of the U.S. Constitution. This also means
considering the role of the courts in a constitutional process, including the nature
of judicial review and stare decisis in a European context. 12  Finally, it is
9. Even if a new constitution does not result from the current process, the discussion raises
several important issues for the future of Europe. Puder argues that the integration process raises
"at least four significant, cross-cutting promises and challenges for shaping the European
integration process." They are (1) an "intent to dispense with the traditional process of
intergovernmental conferences, patchwork revisions, and lengthy consolidation phases" and
substitute "'finalite politique, or, full political integration" (2) a shift from permissive consensus to
positive identification and loyalty; (3) a full discussion of the issues of democracy and legitimacy
within the context of a greater Europe; and (4) enhancement of Europe's posture in the global
arena. Markus G. Puder, Constitutionalizing the European Union - More Than a Sense of
Direction from the Convention on the Future of Europe, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1562, 1569-70
(2003).
10. Tagliabue, supra note 4. A bicameral structure saved the American constitution from the
"big-state small-state" power struggle, and could yet save the EU from the same controversy. A
bicameral structure is not unique to the United States. For example, the German legislature
includes two houses, but it too was modeled on the U.S. Congress following World War II.
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany pioposed the establishment of a two chamber structure,
with an upper house consisting of ministers from each country and a parliament consisting of
popularly-elected representatives. KUPCH N, supra note 3, at 142.
11. See Thomas C. Fischer, "Federalism" in the European Community and the United States: A
Rose by Any Other Name, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 389 (1994) (providing an earlier comparison).
12. Cf, Mark C. Anderson, A Tougher Row to Hoe: The European Union's Ascension as a
Global Superpower Analyzed Through the American Federal Experience, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
&CoM. 83, 90-117 (2001).
[Vol. 12:2
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
necessary to assess the political prospects for the new Constitution and its likely
impact on Europe and beyond.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FEDERAL EUROPE
The reorganization of Europe began with the dreams of Jean Monnet and
Robert Shuman, close on the heels of the terrors of World War II. The success
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 led to the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) in 1957, which in turn led to economic success and desires for
further integration. 13 The original six members of the ECSC 14 were joined by
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973; 15 Greece, Spain and
Portugal between 1981 and 1986; 16 Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995; 17 and
Cypress, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004.18 Currently, applications for
membership are pending for Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Turkey. 19
The move from the commercial-based EEC to the more political European
Union (EU) has been gradual and purposeful. Through a series of treaties during
the 1970s and 1980s, the economic relations between the countries grew closer
and closer. In 1986, the Single European Act created new institutions, accorded
legal status to a variety of institutions, gave the Community new responsibility
over policies that merely affected economic relations such as the environment,
research and development, and regional policy, and made economic and
monetary union an EC objective.
13. See generally The History of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005) (providing further
information relating to the formation of the ESCS and the EURATOM).
14. Id. (listing the original six members as France, West Germany (East Germany united with
West Germany in 1990), Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the Benelux countries)
known as "The Six").
15. Id. (increasing the total membership in the European Union to nine member states known as
"The Nine").
16. Id. (increasing the total membership in the European Union to twelve member states known
as "The Twelve").
17. The History of the European Union-1994, EUROPEAN UNION, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/1994/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005) (providing that
although Norway was accorded membership into the European Union, a Norwegian referendum
was held and the Norwegians decided against accession).
18. The History of the European Union, supra note 13 (increasing total membership in the
European Union to twenty-five member states).
19. Id. Currently only Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein are not members of the
EU within what is traditionally known as "Europe." Europe, EUROPEAN UNION, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/maps/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
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Finally, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European
Union, introduced formal intergovernmental cooperation on a wide number of
fronts and rechristened the arrangement of the "European Union," thus moving
far beyond the commercial and economic beginnings of the old EEC. The
Maastricht Treaty included agreements about consumer protection, public health,
transportation, and education; established a timetable for the move to a single
currency; created European citizenship; and accorded new powers to the
European Parliament.
The Maastricht Treaty created a new organizational scheme for European
organization. This is sometimes called the Three Pillars approach, based on "a
Greek temple built on three thematic pillars that correspond to different
integration depths and governance modes." 20 The Three Pillars included: the
European Communities; a Common Foreign and Security Policy; and
Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs.
The first pillar involved a reorganization of the existing three European
Communities (EEC, ECSC and Euroatom); established union citizenship;
created or changed a large number of institutional structures and procedures; and
among other things created the EMU, now known as the Euro. The first pillar
involved existing "autonomous institutions independent of the Member States
[that] manage the government process. ' 21  Meeting these goals involved
amending the treaties of the three communities.
The second pillar stated that the Member States "shall define and
implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign
and security policy.' 22 This goal was to be pursued in three ways: through
systematic cooperation, through qualified majority voting in the Council, or
• 23
through development of the Western European Union as a defense component.
Pillar three involved joint cooperation and agreement on a number of
matters of common interest, including asylum policy, border security, drug
addiction, international fraud, judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal
matters, customs, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Under the Treaty, the Member
States were required to establish coordinating mechanisms.
Pillars two and three were relatively new to Europe. Both pillars required
laying down operating rules and guidelines, but generally relied on Member
20. Puder, supra note 9, at 1563.
21. Id. at 1563-64.
22. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C310) 1, art. 111-294 para. 1, at 133,
available at http:/europa.eu.intl/eur-lex/lex/JOHtrnl.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Constitution for Europe].
23. The Western European Union is an association of the Benelux countries, France, Germany,
Italy, and the UK as a loosely structured defense-oriented organization founded in 1955.
Obviously, this group encompasses the Member States with the greatest military potential and the
widest international clout.
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States for control and subjected them to national veto. Most importantly, both
pillars created a policy base for future integration and cooperation between
Member States. While both depended on intergovernmentalism, there is the
faintest element of supranationalism when a qualified voting majority, rather
than unanimity, was required for some policy issues. The Treaty was finally
ratified with difficulty, and after negative votes in Denmark and protracted
ratification struggles in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
24
Even after Maastricht, all was not well with the EU. Its procedures and
laws were confusing, complex, and bureaucratic. Much of Europe's legal
structure was embedded in a series of treaties stretching back over forty years,
negotiated by different countries, administrations and individuals, in different
political and economic contexts. The administration and political procedures
had become complex, unwieldy, and burdensome.
The Treaty of Nice of 2000 produced procedures even more complicated
and inefficient. Finally, the heads of state in the European Council began what
was called the post-Nice process, including an open and public debate on the
future of Europe resulting in the Laeken Summit.
III. THE LAEKEN DECLARATION
The Laeken Summit of December 14-15, 2001 created an intriguing
document known as the Laeken Declaration. The Laeken Declaration
unabashedly discusses the possibility of a political union of Europe and
established a procedure for integrating the treaties into a constitution for
Europe. The Laeken Declaration contains three parts. Part I assesses the
political changes in Europe since World War II and addresses many of the public
perceptions and concerns about the EU, its goals, and its procedures.
Part II of the Declaration goes to the heart of the argument for a new
constitution by identifying three basic challenges. First, the Declaration
identifies the need for "[a] better division and definition of competence in theE , • •,,26
European Union. This part of the Declaration asks many more questions than
it answers:
24. NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 69-70 (5th ed.
2003).
25. See generally The Future of The European Union - Laeken Delcaration, EUROPA, Dec. 15,
2001, available at http:lleuropa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/docl5 12Ol en.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2005).
26. Id. at pt. II, para. 2. The term "competence" in Eurospeak means a combination of
"jurisdiction," "power," and "authority" in the parlance of American constitutional lawyers. Thus a
critical question is whether a particular issue is within the competence of the EU, the individual
states, or is a "shared competence" in which both the EU and the individual states may act. Similar
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Can we thus make a clearer distinction between three types of competence:
the exclusive competence of the Union, the competence of the Member States
and the shared competence of the Union and the Member States? At what
level is competence exercised in the most efficient way? How is the principle
of subsidiarity to be applied here? 2 7 And should we not make it clear that any
powers not assigned by the Treaties to the Union fall within the exclusive
sphere of competence of the Member States? And what would be the
consequences of this?
2 8
The Declaration's second argument for a new constitution was the need to
simplify the Union's instruments. The succession of treaties and amendments
included more and more detailed legislation in the treaties. The density of the
treaties led to a need for framework legislation giving the Member States the
ability to maneuver within the guidelines set by the Union.
Finally, the third argument dealt with the need for democracy, transparency,
and efficiency within the Union. There has been a perceived "democratic
deficit" for some time, caused by two factors: first, there are a limited number of
points of access for the public Within the EU. Only the Parliament is directly
elected, and the Parliament plays a limited role in the creation of legislation.
Second, the proceedings of the EU are so dense and complex that few can
maintain any sustained level of understanding or interest. The result is that most
people maintain a stronger democratic connection to their national governments
American constitutional and legal issues abound, resolved through the Supremacy Clause,
delegation of powers, and conflicts of laws issues.
27. The principle in European law that a power should be exercised at the lowest level possible
for effective action. The principle was established in 1975, and later adopted in Article 3b of the
Maastricht Treaty.
28. Id. at pt. I, para. 4. Further questions raised by the Declaration areas pertinent:
The next series of questions should aim, within this new framework and while
respecting the "acquis communautaire" [the body of laws and policies already
adopted by the EU], to determine whether there needs to be any reorganisation
of competence. How can citizens' expectations be taken as a guide here? What
missions would this produce for the Union? And, vice versa, what tasks could
better be left to the Member States? What amendments should be made to the
Treaty on the various policies? How, for example, should a more coherent
common foreign policy and defence policy be developed? Should the Petersberg
tasks be updated? Do we want to adopt a more integrated approach to police and
criminal law cooperation? How can economic-policy coordination be stepped
up? How can we intensify cooperation in the field of social inclusion, the
environment, health and food safety? But then, should not the day-to-day
administration and implementation of the Union's policy be left more
emphatically to the Member States and, where their constitutions so provide, to
the regions? Should they not be provided with guarantees that their spheres of
competence will not be affected?
Id. at pt. II, para. 5.
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than to the EU.29 A series of issues revolve around the need for increased
democracy while increasing transparency and efficiency.
IV. THE CONVENTION
The Laeken Declaration ended by convening a Convention under the
leadership of former French President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing as Chairman.
The Convention was made up of fifteen representatives of the Heads of State of
the Member States, thirty members of the national parliaments (two from each
Member State), sixteen members of the European Parliament, and two
Commission representatives. Accession candidate countries were represented in
the same way (one representative of the Head of State and two representatives of
national parliaments), but were unable to prevent consensus. There were a total
of 102 representatives, including those from the accession candidate states, plus
alternates for each full member. Other representatives of EU institutions were
invited for the purpose of observing or addressing the Convention. The
proceedings began on March 1, 2002, and were to last a year. The final
document "may comprise either different options, indicating the degree of
support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved....
[T]he final document will provide a starting point for discussions in the
Intergovernmental Conference, which will take the ultimate decisions."
30
The Convention met in plenary session once a month at the European
Parliament chambers in Brussels. The sessions were open to the public and each
took place over two half-days. The real work of the Convention took place in
working groups looking into specific issues more closely. There were a total of
eleven working groups, each of which dealt with an important issue confronting
the Convention, and each of which issued a report.
3
'
The Convention's proceedings took place in three stages: a listening phase,
aimed at identification of the expectations and needs of Member States and
European society; a deliberating phase, during which the Convention would
compare the various opinions and assess their implications and consequences;
29. JOHN MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 142-
49 (2nd ed. 2002); see also NUGENT, supra note 24, at 214-15.
30. European Convention - Debate on the Future of Europe, EUROPA, at
http:/www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/e-g-conven-future.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). IGCs, or
Intergovernmental Conferences, are the forum for formulating and adopting treaties, "and
unanimity... is necessary for treaty provisions to be agreed." Since the Draft Constitution is in
fact a treaty, at least to begin with, unanimity was required. NUGENT, supra note 24, at 93. See id.
at 93-98 for a discussion of the workings of IGCs.
31. The working groups considered: Subsidiarity; Charter/ECHR (Fundamental Rights); Legal
Personality; National Parliaments; Complementary Competencies; Economic Governance;
External Action (Foreign Policy); Defence; Simplification; Freedom, Security and Justice; and
Social Europe.
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and a proposing stage, during which proposals would be synthesized and
proposed.
On July 18, 2003, Chairman Valerie Giscard D'Estaing officially handed
over the full Draft Treaty to the Italian Presidency of the European Council, and
called upon the President to conduct the Intergovernmental Conference so that it
could be brought to completion under the Italian Presidency in December 2003,
and signed in May 2004, just before the next European elections. Obviously that
did not happen. The Preface of the Draft Treaty first submitted in July 2003
identified responses to the Laeken Declaration's challenges with a general
statement of what the convention identified as its strong points:
The Convention has identified responses to the questions put in the Laeken
declaration:
- it proposes a better division of Union and Member State competences;
- it recommends a merger of the Treaties and the attribution of legal
personality to the Union;
- it establishes a simplification of the Union's instruments of action;
- it proposes measures to increase the democracy, transparency and
efficiency of the European Union, by developing the contribution of
national Parliaments to the legitimacy of the European design, by
simplifying the decision-making processes, and by making the functioning
of the European Institutions more transparent and comprehensible;
- it establishes the necessary measures to improve the structure and enhance
the role of each of the Union's three institutions, taking account, in
particular, of the consequences of enlargement.
32
V. THE STRUGGLE OVER THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION
Following the Draft Constitution's presentation on July 18, 2003, a series of
disagreements immediately arose over the powers of the EU itself and the
balance of power between Member States. Those disagreements almost resulted
in the failure of the Constitution. On December 13, 2003, the leaders of the
twenty-five current and prospective members of the EU failed to reach
agreement on the draft, signaling a period of intense negotiation.
Chief among the disputes was the definition of a QMV, the system of
weighted votes among Member States, and to which issues the QMV would
32. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Preface, July 18, 2003, Convention
850/03, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.enO3.pdf (last visited
Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
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apply. 33 Other disputes centered on whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights
could be used to change Britain's labor laws, whether the European Commission
would have the power to enforce the European "Stability and Growth Pact," and
Poland's campaign to insert a mention of God or Europe's Christian heritage
over the objection of secular countries. 34
A number of issues decided by the Council of Ministers or the European
Council require a vote by a "qualified majority." Under the original Draft
Constitution, a qualified majority consisted of a simple majority of the Member
States, "representing at least three fifths of the population of the Union." 35 If
there was no requirement for the European Council or the Council of Ministers
to act based on a proposal from the Commission, or on the initiative of the Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the required qualified majority consisted of two
thirds of the Member States.
36
The Constitution as submitted on October 29, 2004, changed those rules
significantly. A "qualified majority" is now defined as "55 % of the members of
the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States
comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union."37  A new "blocking
minority" is defined as at least four Council members. 38 "[W]hen the Council
does not act on a proposal from the Commission or from the Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs, the qualified majority shall be defined as at least 72 % of the
members of the Council, representing Member States comprising at least 65 %
of the population of the Union."
39
The change came about as a result of long haggling and negotiations,
largely between the smaller Member States, largely newly-admitted Eastern
33. See Finally, a constitution. Now the hard part, THE ECONOMIST GLOBAL AGENDA, June 22,
2004, available at http://www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/displaystory.cfm?story-
id=2783543 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
34. See id.
35. Draft Treaty, supra note 32, art. 24, para. 1. An attached "Protocol on the Representation of
Citizens in the European Parliament and the Weighting of Votes in the European Council and the
Council of Ministers" provided that for deliberations in the European Council and Council of
Ministers, various voting weights would be provided. The largest were Germany, France, Italy, and
the United Kingdom, each with 29 votes out of a total of 321. Close behind were Spain and
Poland, each with 27. !d. at 232.
36.1d. art. 24, para. 2.
37.Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-25, para.1, at 21.
38.Id.
39.Id. art. 1-25, para. 2, at 21. Attached Protocol 34 "On the Transitional Provisions Relating to
the Institutions and Bodies of the Union" provides the new weighting scheme for the period 2004-
2009. Under that scheme, the weights remain the same as under the Draft Constitution. However,
since the percentage required for a qualified vote has changed and since the number of items
requiring a qualified voting majority has increased, the small states found sufficient protection to
agree to the Constitution. See generally id. at 382.
20051
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European nations, and the larger Member States, principally France and
Germany. The new arrangements assure that the smaller states cannot be simply
overruled by a small group of large nations. The United Kingdom also "insisted
on retaining its veto on key aspects of defence and foreign policy, taxation and
social security."
40
The United Kingdom also insisted on some limitations on the application of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights to its domestic labor markets. A declaration
provided that the Constitution would give no new legal rights that would breach
British industrial laws such as those on secondary picketing and secret ballots.
This language was to be included in the text of the charter rather than in a
preamble, where it would not have full legal effect.
41
The Netherlands wanted the Commission to enforce the "Stability and
Growth Pact," the EU effort for budgetary discipline in the EMU. The Stability
and Growth Pact was adopted in 1997 and fully "took effect when the euro was
launched on I January 1999." 42 The Pact contained a variety of limits on
national budgets as a condition of membership in the EU,43 but it was largely
unenforced. France and Germany were among the most egregious offenders,
and their combined power led the Netherlands to back down from its position.
The European Constitution's Preamble does not mention God or a deity of
any sort, and in fact draws its "INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and
humanist inheritance of Europe."44 Catholic countries across Europe, led by
Poland, objected to the lack of reference to God in the document, and in fact
threatened the adoption of the document. 45  Secular nations, led by France,
wanted to keep reference to God out of the document, in part because of their
secularity, and in part because of the diversity of Europe itself.46 The secular
nations won that battle, and the Preamble remained secular in nature.
47
In the end, through compromise and negotiation, the contending factions
were able to come to agreement on June 18, 2004. The Heads of State came
together on October 29, 2004, and the document was signed and set for
ratification.
40. Finally, a constitution. Now the hard part, supra note 33.
41. Id.
42. Economic and Financial Affairs: The Stability and Growth Pact, EUROPA, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/about/activities/sgp/sgp-en.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2005).
43. See generally TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 104, available at
http:lleuropa.eu.intleur-lexlenltreaties/selectedllivre223.html#anArt6 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter EC TREATY].
44. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, at 3.
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VI. THE CONSTITUTION IN BROAD STROKES
To Americans accustomed to the ambiguous and concise U.S. Constitution,
the sprawling and detailed European Constitution may seem strange indeed.
48
The European Constitution is spread across four titles divided into 448 sections
covering 348 pages. An additional 382 pages of Protocols and Annexes are
joined by 121 pages of declarations. It is also important to note that there are
twenty-one official languages "the texts in each of these languages being equally
authentic."
49
Provisions range from the lofty and aspirational to the mundane and trivial.
Large portions of the Constitution consider issues that are dealt with in U.S. law
by federal or state legislation, or even administrative regulations. Large sections
deal with the relationship of the European Union with the Member States. Other
large parts deal with commercial policy, the nature and power of European
institutions, and relations with foreign countries.
The Preface to the Draft Constitution stated that the Convention was asked
to draw up proposals on three subjects, notably the so-called "democratic
deficit," how to organize politics and the expanding powers of the EU in an
enlarged Union, and how to make the Union a stabilizing model. The preface
notes that instead of simply answering the questions, the Convention went
further and the proceedings "ultimately led to the drawing up of a draft Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe, which achieved a broad consensus at the
plenary session." 50 The Preamble is a lofty, literary, and aspirational statement
of the aims of Europe5 1 containing the purposes of the Constitution:
DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the
inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy,
equality and the rule of law,
48. Before Americans should criticize the approach the Europeans have taken, they should
perhaps look to what a newly-minted U.S. Constitution might look like in 2005. Special interests,
media publicity, regional jealousies and two hundred years of experience and judicial gloss would
likely yield a document quite similar to, and perhaps as voluminous as, that presented to the
Europeans.
49. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. IV-448, para. 1, at 191. Those languages are
"Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish,
Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and
Swedish." Id.
50. Draft Treaty, supra note 32, at Preface.
51. Id. at 3. The original preamble of the Draft Constitution began with a quote from Thucydides
(It, 37), in both Greek and modem languages: "Our Constitution... is called a democracy
because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the greatest number." Id.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
BELIEVING that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to
continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity, for the good
of all its inhabitants, including the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes
to remain a continent open to culture, learning and social progress; and that it
wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and
to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world,
CONVINCED that, while remaining proud of their own national identities
and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former
divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny,
CONVINCED that, thus 'United in diversity', Europe offers them the best
chance of pursuing, with due regard for the rights of each individual and in
awareness of their responsibilities towards future generations and the Earth,
the great venture which makes of it a special area of human hope,
DETERMINED to continue the work accomplished within the framework of
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and the Treaty on
European Union, by ensuring the continuity of the Community acquis,
GRATEFUL to the members of the European Convention for having prepared
the draft of this Constitution on behalf of the citizens and States of Europe.
52
The four major divisions of the Constitution are labeled as "Parts," each
containing sections which are numbered consecutively throughout the document.
Part I is untitled. This Part deals with such global themes as the definition and
objectives of the Union, fundamental rights, Union competences, Union
institutions, and other broad areas. Part 1 seems to be an introduction to many of
the larger issues within the Constitution and approaches these topics in broad
strokes. The document returns to many of these same issues in detail later in the
document. The potentially differing phraseology found in Part I, and that found
later, may prove to be a stumbling block to consistent interpretation.
Part II is entitled "The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union,"53 and
will be the Bill of Rights of the European Union. This document has already
been signed by the then fifteen EU members in December of 2000 as a political
declaration. The European Council, the European Commission and the
Parliament jointly signed the Charter, but it is not yet accorded treaty status. The
Charter contains fifty-four articles divided into seven chapters. The chapters are
preceded by a separate preamble 54 and are labeled as Dignity, Freedoms,
52. Id.
53. Id. at 41.
54. A soaring paragraph in the Preamble to the Charter provides:
Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity;
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Equality, Solidarity, Citizens' Rights, Justice, and General Provisions. The
document is remarkable to Americans for the nature of some of the rights
included, which will be discussed further on.
The Convention considered three ways of dealing with the controversial
Charter. First, there might have been an indirect reference to the Charter,
placing the Charter outside of the Constitution but ultimately legally binding as
an independent document; second, there might have been a more straightforward
reference to the Charter, leaving it independent but giving it more legal status
and formal recognition within the Constitution by incorporation; or third,
wholesale incorporation of the document into the Constitution. The drafters have
chosen the latter course.5 It is likely to prove a controversial decision.
Part III, entitled "The Policies and Functioning of the Union," is the longest
and most specific of the three parts. Part III is 242 pages and includes seven
titles, with detailed provisions including both detailed rules and procedures and
guiding principles on how policies are to be created within the Union structure.
The Part includes specific guidance on such issues as the creation of the internal
(common) market, rules on competition, economic and monetary policy,
employment, social policy, agriculture and fisheries, the environment, consumer
protection, energy, authority and jurisdiction of the courts, public health, culture,
vocational training and sports, among many others.
Part III also provides the organization and legitimacy and authority of all of
the EU's institutions, including the Parliament, the European Council, the
Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Court of
Auditors, and provides authority for the European Investment Bank. It also
establishes the financial framework of the EU itself, including the budget
process. It is the true nuts and bolts of how the EU is to operate for the future.
Part IV is relatively short, including the continuity and scope and the
ratification process. Under the terms of the treaty, the Constitution is to be
ratified "by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements. 5 6 The same article provides that the Constitution
may be amended through a relatively complex procedure requiring the
convening of a Convention by a simple majority vote. The Convention is to be
composed of representatives of: (1) the national parliaments of the Member
States; (2) the Heads of State or Government of the Member States; (3) the
European Parliament; and (4) the Commission. The Convention may adopt
it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the
individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the
Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.
Id.
55. See generally Puder, supra note 9.
56. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. IV-447, para. 1, at 191.
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amendments by consensus, and the Conference of Representatives of the
Member States then determines, by common accord, the amendments. There is a
simplified amendment process in which the European Council may adopt a
provisional amendment in the form of an authorization to act adopted by a
qualified majority, followed by an opportunity for national parliaments to
object. 57
Ratification was to have taken place within two years by four fifths of the
Member States, but it is not at all clear what happens if ratification does not
occur. By its very terms, "[ijf... four fifths of the Member States have ratified
it and one or more Member States have encountered difficulties in proceeding
with ratification, the matter shall be referred to the European Council."
58
VII. SOME AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A comparison of the EU Constitution to the American Constitution is
inevitable. The American frame of reference must clearly be the basic document
and the history and judicial gloss that have formed around it the last 215 years.
During that time, a number of other national charters have been formed either
based on or with an eye to the U.S. Constitution, including several European
constitutions. As a result, American lawyers and others schooled in the history
of the U.S. Constitution must have a long list of questions about the functioning
of the proposed European Constitution. Among those questions are certainly the
following:
(1) What is the function of the courts, and particularly the European Court
of Justice, regarding the interpretation of the constitution? Do the concepts of
stare decisis and judicial review apply, and with what force?
(2) How have the Europeans resolved the tension between federal and state
power? How do the complex issues of EU and Member State "competences"
relate to the American concepts of granted powers, the supremacy clause, and
issues of pre-emption?
(3) How is legislation created?
(4) How does the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union compare to
the American Bill of Rights?
(5) What is the central EU power to regulate commerce, and how will it be
harmonized with Member State power to regulate commercial policies?
(6) How will the EU be financed? Will the EU have the power to tax?
57. Id. art. IV-445, at 190-91.
58. Id. art. 1V-443, para. 4, at 190. The balance of that Article deals with procedures for revision
and amendment, so it is not at all clear that the intent was to put a two-year "drop dead" provision
for ratification of the main document.
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(7) What is the practical effect of including specific "legislative" acts and
policies within the Constitution, especially in light of cumbersome processes for
amendment?
(8) How will the tension between the guarantees of a market economy and
the specific guarantees of worker and consumer protection play out?
In addition, two overriding political issues require discussion:
(9) What is the effect of the document on the sovereignty of the Member
States? Will the Member States willingly give up enough individual freedom of
action to make the document work?
(10) Will the document - or one like it - ultimately be ratified?
The balance of this article will discuss the EU Constitution in the context of
a comparison to its American counterpart and the manner in which the U.S.
Constitution is applied in American courts. The first questions relate to the
courts themselves and to basic doctrines such as precedent and judicial review
essential to the American system of constitutional law. Other important issues
deal with the relationships of power within the Constitution, the nature of the EU
"bill of rights," and the grants of authority that have been found critical in the
American experience.
A. The EU Courts and their Functions
American lawyers and constitutional scholars have grown up imbued with
the notions of stare decisis and judicial review. Most American legal scholars
can quote verbatim the classic language from Marbury v. Madison:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to
the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case,
so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding
the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
59
59. 5 U.S. 137, 177-80 (1803).
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1. Current Judicial Structures in the EU
Before venturing into the proposed new judicial arrangements, it is
necessary to sketch out current judicial structure and practices in the EU. Under
current EU arrangements, there are two EU Courts: the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI).
Generally speaking the ECJ serves as the supreme court of the EU,
including taking appeals from the CFI under most circumstances. 60 The CFI was
created in 1988 at the request of the ECJ in order to deal with its expanding
docket. The CFI's jurisdiction was originally limited, but within five years the
CFI received expanded "jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance all
actions brought by natural or legal persons."
6 1
The ECJ is the court of first instance in a number of areas under the various
treaties. Those cases of direct action (roughly similar to cases of original
jurisdiction in the U.S. Supreme Court) include cases against Member States
based on whether they have failed to fulfill obligations under the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, brought either by the Commission or by
other member states; applications by a Member State, the Council, the
Commission or the EP to annul an act of the EU; actions by Member States,
community institutions, and sometimes legal and natural persons against EU
institutions for failure to act; and actions against the EU or its institutions to
establish liability. 62 Normally, the latter two cases are now dealt with by the
CFI.
63
The Court of Justice also hears cases involving ruling on points of EU law
that have been referred by national courts.64  These cases are requests for
preliminary ruling. A national court must make an appropriate referral. These
advisory cases, largely foreign in American law, form one of the largest
categories of cases before the ECJ. They provide consistency and uniformity of
interpretation, and are generally accepted by all national courts as setting
precedent.
65
The ECJ made an important contribution to the primacy of EU law in 1963
and 1964 when it declared that the Treaty of Rome was not just a treaty, but was
a constitutional instrument providing obligations on member states, and took
precedence over national law.
66
60. See NUGENT, supra note 24, at 242.
61. Id. at 257.
62. See id. at 248-52.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 242.
65. Id. at 252-53.
66. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, at 110.
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Certain "decisions of the CFI are [also] subject to appeal to the Court of
Justice on points of law." 67  As in most American courts, appeals are not
possible on the substance of the case, but only on points of law. "There are three
broad grounds for appeal: the CFI lacked jurisdiction, it breached procedural
rules, or it infringed Community law." 68 To date, there have been few appeals,
in part because the CF1 has treated decisions of the ECJ as binding precedent. 69
Finally, "the Council, the Commission, or a member state plus the EP"7 °
may ask the ECJ for an advisory opinion "on whether a prospective international
agreement is compatible with the provisions of the [Nice] Treaty." 7 1  The
Court's decision is binding and an adverse ruling means that the agreement
cannot enter into force without amendment.
72
The ECJ has become very busy as its importance has increased. In the
1960s, it heard about fifty cases per year, making about fifteen to twenty
judgments; today, it hears 370-400 cases per year, and makes 200-300
judgments. It was this volume of cases that resulted in the creation of the CFI in
1988. The ECJ has fifteen judges, each appointed for a six-year renewable term
of office, and the terms are staggered. Each is effectively a national appointee.
73
Traditionally, the doctrine of stare decisis has far less authority in the civil
law systems of continental Europe.74  However, the rulings of the European
Court of Justice have played a significant role in the creation of European law.
The Court has had a continuing duty to interpret and apply European law, and
European statutory and treaty law is notoriously ambiguous.7 5 EU law has been
strengthened and extended by the ECJ, and it is clear that the precedent value of
the ECJ decisions goes far beyond the usual weight given decisions in other
European civil law courts. 76
67. See NUGENT, supra note 24, at 257.





73. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, at 110-11.
74. With the exception of Great Britain and Ireland, of course. The ECJ does follow the notion
of stare decisis in its decisions. See Peter Orebech, The EU Competency Confusion: Limits,
"Extension Mechanisms," Split Power, Subsidiarity, and "Institutional Clashes", 13 J.
TRANSNAT'LL. & POL'Y 99, n.81 (2003).
75. The ambiguity stems from a number of factors, including the need for political compromise
in the legislative process, the need for speed in decision-making and the legislative process, and
the number of languages involved. See NUGENT, supra note 24, at 242.
76. The following language is relatively typical: "It is appropriate to bear in mind .... that in
accordance with settled case-law the primacy of Community law requires any provision of national
law which contravenes a Community rule to be disapplied ... " Case C-198/01, Consorzio
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2. Judicial Structure Under the EU Constitution
So what does the EU Constitution have to say about the courts, the right of
judicial review, and the concept of stare decisis? First, it is important to
distinguish between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of
Justice. The former term refers to the entire EU court system, which is
somewhat expanded and renamed under the Constitution. 77 The latter term is
used to describe the current European Court of Justice. The Constitution also
provides for a newly named General Court and for unnamed specialized courts.
78
There is no mention of the current CFI, although the General Court appears to
take on all of its form and most of its functions. The Court of Justice consists of
one judge from each Member State, while the General Court has at least one
judge from each Member State. All are appointed by common accord of the
Member States for renewable terms of six years.
79
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the Draft Constitution is
vastly expanded, but largely on an appellate basis only. A new court - the
General Court - is given jurisdiction of first instance over virtually all of the
prior issues of ECJ jurisdiction of first instance.80 Those actions include actions
to review the legality of actions of the EU institutions; 81 actions for failure to
act;82 compensation for damages; 83 disputes between the Union and its
servants; 84 and arbitration clauses in contracts involving the Union. 85 In each of
those cases, decisions of the General Court are subject to a right of appeal to the
Court of Justice on points of law only.
86
The General Court also has jurisdiction to hear questions for a preliminary
ruling. In such cases, the General Court may refer the case directly to the Court
of Justice if it determines that the case "requires a decision of principle likely to
affect the unity or consistency of Union law.'87  Decisions referred for a
Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v. AutoritA Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2003 E.C.R. I-
08055, § 48.
77. See generally Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-29, para. 1, at 14.
78. Id. ('The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, the
General Court and specialised courts,").
79. Id. art. 111-358, para. 1, at 157.
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also id. art. 111-365, para. 1, at 159.
82. Id. art. 111-358, para. 1, at 157; see also Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 111-367, at
160-61.
83. Id. art. II1-358, para. 1, at 157; see also id. art. 111-370, at 161.
84. Id. art. 111-358, para. 1, at 157; see also id. art. 111-372, at 162.
85. Id. art. 111-358, para. 1, at 157; see also Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 111-374, at
162.
86. Id. art. 111-358, para. 1, at 157.
87. Id. art. 111-358, para. 3, at 157.
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preliminary ruling "may exceptionally be subject to review by the Court of
Justice... where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law
being affected."
88
The Court of Justice has jurisdiction of first instance in cases involving
requests for preliminary rulings regarding interpretation of the Constitution and
"the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions... of the Union."
89
The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction of first instance "in disputes
concerning: ... the fulfilment by Member States of obligations under the Statute
of the European Investment Bank,"90 measures adopted by the European
Investment Bank,9 1 and "fulfilment by national central banks of obligations
under the Constitution and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and the European Central Bank.' 92 Disputes between Member States as to the
subject matter of the Constitution may be submitted by special agreement. 93
Some special jurisdictional provisions are also worth mentioning. Unless
jurisdiction has been conferred by the Constitution, disputes involving the Union
as a party may still be brought in the courts of Member States. 94 Jurisdiction is
specifically withheld regarding fixing of customs duties95 and all issues dealing
with a common security and defense policy. 96  Similarly, jurisdiction is
specifically withheld to review the validity or proportionality of police
operations carried out by a Member State, or "the exercise of the responsibilities
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order
and the safeguarding of internal security."
97
Finally, the Draft provides that "specialised courts attached to the General
Court' 98 may be established by law to determine certain classes of action.
Appeals generally will be to the General Court on points of law only.
99
88. Id. art. 111-358, para. 3, at 158.
89. Id. art. 111-369, at 161.
90. Id. art. 111-373, at 162.
91. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. I1-373 (b) & (c), at 162. This provision may be
interpreted to give jurisdiction of first instance to the General Court.
92. Id. art. 111-373 (d), at 162.
93. Id. art. 111-375, at 162.
94. Id. art. IH-375 para. 1, at 162.
95. Id. art. IH-376, at 163.
96. Id.
97.Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 111-377, at 163.
98. Id. art. 111-359, para. 1, at 158.
99. Id. art. 111-359, para. 3, at 158.
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3. Judicial Review of Central Government Actions
The issue of whether judicial review exists under the European Constitution
is answered by Articles 1I-365 and 366. While a case of first instance for the
General Court, these sections provide that the Court of Justice:
shall review the legality of European laws and framework laws, of acts of the
Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than
recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of
the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-A-vis third
parties.'
0
Article 111-366 further provides:
If the action is well founded, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall
declare the act concerned to be void.
However, the Court shall, if it considers this necessary, state which of the
effects of the act which it has declared void shall be considered as
definitive.
10 1
Articles 111-367 and 368 go on to provide a procedure for dealing with an
,,102EU institution which fails to act "in infringement of the Constitution. Article
Ii-367 provides a procedure for establishing the infringement, including a prior
demand that the institution act and a two month time period (which may be
extended) within which to bring the action. 103 Article I-368 provides that an
"institution, body, office or agency whose act has been declared void, or whose
failure to act has been declared contrary to the Constitution, shall be required to
take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice
of the European Union." 10 4 It should be noted that these provisions, including
Articles 111-367 and 368, apply only to EU laws and institutions, not to those of
Member States.
The result of all this is that the Court of Justice has in fact been given
something very similar to the American right of judicial review, at least insofar
as EU institutions are concerned. The Court of Justice has the right to rule on
the legality of European laws and framework laws, as well as acts of the Council
of Ministers, of the Commission, of the European Central Bank, and "acts of the
European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal
effects vis-A-vis third parties."
105
100. Id. art. II1-365, para. 1, at 160-61.
101. Id. art. II1-366, at 160.
102. Id. art. 111-367, para. 1, at 160.
103. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22.
104. Id. art. 111-368, at 161.
105. Id. art. 111-365, para. 1, at 160-61.
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This right of judicial review becomes particularly important in light of
Article 1-6, the Primacy Clause, which states that "[t]he Constitution and law
adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on
it shall have primacy over the law of the Member States."' 106 Thus, it appears
that in the context of EU institutions and laws, the Court of Justice has
something very similar to the American right of judicial review.
The same is not true for decisions from Member States. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee 17and Cohens v. Virginia10 8 did not settle the issue of the authority of the
U.S. Supreme Court until more than a decade after the right of judicial review of
federal governmental actions was established in Marbury v. Madison. It is also
likely to take some time for the issue of EU judicial authority over Member State
actions to be resolved. 109 This may be the single most important area that needs
to be settled to make the European constitution viable.
110
B. EU and Member State "Competences " and the American Concept of Granted
Powers
Unlike the rather vague concept of granted powers embedded in the U.S.
Constitution, the EU Constitution seeks to specifically set out categories of
"competences" as between the Union and the Member States. 11  The Union is
given "exclusive competence" over some areas and "shared competence" with
the Member States over others. 112 The Constitution attempts to draw bright lines
around the areas of exclusive competence. There are no exclusive Member State
competences. A simmering problem may center on areas that may have been
omitted or will develop over time, since there is no residual clause like the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
1 1 3
106. Id. art. 1-6, at 12.
107. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
108. 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
109. The issue is clouded somewhat by the removal of section (2) from what finally became
Article 1-6 of the Constitution. In the original draft, section (2) provided that "Member States shall
take all appropriate measures, general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations flowing
from the Constitution or resulting from the Union Institutions' acts." Draft Treaty, supra note 32,
art. 10, para. 2. The removal of this duty could provide support for the position that Member
States are not completely bound by Union decisions.
110. Some would argue that American federal courts did not finally gain the right to review state
court decisions, even in the context of the federal constitution, until the issue was finally settled by
the Civil War, and that Martin and Cohens were merely the opening volleys in the clash between
the federal and state judicial authority.
111. Orebech, supra note 74, 107-08 (providing an exhaustive treatment).
112. Id.
113. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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An exclusive competence conferred on the Union means that only the
Union may legislate, unless the Union permits the Member States to act.
114
Shared competences mean that both the Union and Member States may
legislate.1 1 5  In what promises to be a critical phrase dealing with shared
competences, the "Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent
that the Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its
competence." 16 These words appear subject to the interpretation that the Union
has clear authority to act to the exclusion of Member States. These words also
seem to indicate that the European framers considered the preemption question
and it has been settled similar to the way American courts have interpreted the
Supremacy Clause. They also have great import for issues of sovereignty and
ultimate authority.
Article 1-12 makes one area of exclusive EU competence crystal clear: the
definition and implementation of a common foreign and security policy,
"including the progressive framing of a common defence policy." 117 In the area
of economic policy, Member States are required to "coordinate" their economic
and employment policies. 18  Thus two of the largest areas of governmental
responsibility - the economy and foreign and defense policies - are placed
squarely in the Union's sphere of exclusive competence. Again, as indicia of
sovereignty, the weighty issues of both guns and butter seem to put the thumb
heavily on the Union side of the scale. 119  Other areas of exclusive Union
competence include the customs union, competition rules for those Member
States whose currency is the Euro, monetary policy, a common commercial
policy, and "the conservation of marine biological resources under the common
fisheries policy."
120
Areas of shared competence include issues of: "(a) internal markets; (b)
social policy. . . ; (c) economic, social and territorial cohesion; (d) agriculture
114. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-12, para. 1, at 15.
115. Id. art. 1-12, para. 2, at 15.
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 1-12, para. 2, at 15. "Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the
Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall
comply with the Union's action in this area. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's
interests or likely to impair its effectiveness." Id. art. 1-16, para. 2, at 17.
118. Id. art. 1-12, para. 3, at 15. A prior draft provided that "[t]he Union shall have competence to
promote and coordinate the economic and employment policies of the Member States." Draft
Treaty, supra note 32, at art. 11, at 11.
119. Art. 1-15 and 16 explain further the Union's competence in both economic/employment
policies and foreign/security policies. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, arts. 1-15 & 1-16, at
17.
120. Id. art. 1-13, para. 1(d), at 15. The issue of fisheries has been critical in the EU for decades.
Competition for fishing rights in the North Atlantic has been a driving and dividing force - and
even a source of armed conflict - for hundreds of years.
[Vol. 12:2
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; (e)
environment; (f) consumer protection; (g) transport; (h) trans-European
networks; (i) energy; (j) freedom, security and justice; (k) common safety
concerns in public health matters."
' 121
There is also specific mention of "supporting, coordinating or
complementary action" 122 in areas of: "(a) protection and improvement of
human health; (b) industry; (c) culture; (d) tourism; (e) education, youth, sport,
and vocational training; (f) civic protection; [and] (g) administrative
cooperation."
123
The Flexibility Clause of Article 1-18 appears to be the EU' s approximation
of the American Necessary and Proper Clause. If action is necessary within the
framework of the policies of the Constitution, and the Constitution has not
provided the necessary powers, the Council of Ministers "shall adopt the
appropriate measures." A unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers and
consent of Parliament is required.
125
The division of competences in the EU is an effort to resolve some of the
most basic issues of federalism. 126  Those issues have been central to the
American constitutional discussion since the days of Gibbons v. Ogden. The
same issues are certainly going to arise in the context of the EU Constitution.
While EU drafters have done an admirable job of trying to sharply delineate
federal and state power and the areas of competence for the EU and the Member
States, those issues will change with time. What was a shared competency will
grow into an exclusive competency, and perhaps vice versa. What is undefined
will have to be defined. Issues will arise under the Flexibility Clause that no one
can imagine today. European constitutional lawyers and scholars will need to
deal with the vagaries of federalism, much as Americans have done for two
centuries.
Implicit in this tension is the fear of political centripetal force. In the
American context, the historically loose association of states and weak central
government has evolved into a strong federal union and relatively weak state
governments. It sometimes seems that it is inevitable that power tends to
centralize. Growing needs for uniformity, lack of tolerance for aberrant
practices, and strong commercial, environmental and human rights pressures
121. Id. art. 1-14, para. 2, at 16.
122. Id. art. 1-17, para. 1, at 17.
123. Id.
124. Id. art. 1-18, para. 1, at 18.
125. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-18, para. 1, at 18.
126. Puder argues that the approach taken seems "German." The overall approach is one of
vertical federalism with "a catalog that divides sovereignty between the federation and the states."
Puder, supra note 9, at 1585-86 (discussing KARL-HEINZ SEIFERT & DIETER HOMIG, GRUNDGESETZ
FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 200, 331 (1988)).
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may well create a long slope toward centralization. Critics of the European
federalization may well point to the long American experience as support for
their contention that centralization is a necessary but unwelcome outcome.
C. Forms of Legislation and Legislative Procedures
The European legislative process is substantially more complex and
ambiguous than the American system. The EU Constitution provides for four
different legal "instruments," or forms of legislation including European laws,
the European framework laws, European regulations, and European decisions.
127
In addition, there may exist recommendations and opinions, which by the terms
of the Constitution, have no binding force. 
1 28
The two legislative forms with the most potency are European laws and
European framework laws. A European law is "a legislative act of general
application" 29 and is "binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all
Member States," 130 while a framework law is "binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods."
' 131
The European Parliament and the Council jointly adopt European laws and
framework laws. 132 If the Parliament and the Council "cannot reach agreement
on an act, it shall not be adopted."' 133 The Commission ordinarily submits both
types of laws to the Parliament and the Council, and both go through an identical
process involving three "readings" and possibly a conciliation process.134 Under
the procedures, both types of legislation start in the Parliament with a first
reading, at which the Parliament "adopts its position" and communicates it to the
Council of Ministers. 135 If the Council of Ministers approves the Parliament's
position, the proposed act is adopted. 136 If it does not approve the Parliament's
position, the Council of Ministers adopts its position, communicates its position
to the Parliament, and informs the Parliament of why it adopted its position.
137
The European Parliament may then adopt the Council's position, in which case it
is adopted. 13  The Parliament may also reject the position or propose
127. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-33, para. 1, at 26.




132. Id. art. 1-34, para. 1, at 27.
133. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-34, para. 1, at 27.
134. Id. art. 111-396, at 170.
135. Id. art. 111-396, para. 3, at 170.
136. Id. art. 111-396, para. 4, at 170.
137. Id. art. 111-396, para. 5-6, at 170.
138. Id. art. 111-396, para. 7(a), at 170.
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amendments, followed by a conciliation process and possibly a third reading. 139
European laws and framework laws may also be proposed by recommendation
of the European Central Bank, at the request of the Court of Justice, the
European Investment Bank, or on the initiative of a group of Member States.'
40
Generally speaking, the Parliament acts by majority of the votes cast.1 4 1
The Council of Ministers, consisting of a representative of each Member
State, acts by a qualified majority of its members; however, if the Constitution
specifies otherwise, it may act by a simple majority of its members. 142  A
qualified majority consists of "at least 55 % of the members of the Council,
comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising
at least 65 % of the population of the Union."'143 In some instances, the qualified
majority may shift to "at least 72 % of the members of the Council, representing
Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union."'
144
A European regulation is "a non-legislative act of general application for
the implementation of legislative acts and of certain provisions of the
Constitution."' 45 Regulations may be adopted by the Council of Ministers and
the Commission, or may be adopted by the European Central Bank when
authorized by the Constitution. 146 In addition, "European laws and framework
laws may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt.., regulations."'
147
The EU Constitution provides that "[t]he objectives, content, scope and duration
of the delegation of power shall be explicitly defined in the European laws and
framework laws."' 148 A delegation may not cover the essential elements of an
area. 14 9  "A European decision shall be a non-legislative act, binding in its
139. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 111-396, para. 8-14, at 170.
140. Id. art. 1-34, para. 3, at 27. Those limited situations in which either European laws or
framework laws may be adopted at the initiative of one-quarter of the Member States involve
Sections four and five of Chapter IV, dealing with Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and
Police Cooperation. See id. art. 111-264, at 114.
141. id. art. 111-338, at 152.
142. Id. art. 111-343, at 153-54.
143. Id. art. 1-25, para. 1, at 21.
144. Constitution for Eurorpe, supra note 22, art. 1-25, para. 2, at 21.
145. Id. art. 1-33, para. 1, at 27.
146. Id. art. 1-35, para. 2, at 27.
147. Id. art. 1-36, para. 1, at 28. This delegated power parallels the ability of the American
Congress to delegate the power to enact regulations to administrative bodies through an enabling
act.
148. Id.
149. Id. The American experience involves substantial judicial gloss requiring that Congress
provide first a "standard" by which it could be determined whether the agency had exceeded its
grant of authority (Cf Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)), and later
requiring merely a "policy" statement by Congress (Cf Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
2005]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
entirety," but a decision may specify those to whom it is binding.
150
"Recommendations and opinions [adopted by the various institutions] shall have
no binding force."'
151
D. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union: Comparison to the
American Bill of Rights
Perhaps the most clearly formed part of the draft EU Constitution is Part II,
which consists of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
This document was already signed by the fifteen EU members in December of
2000 as a "political declaration." The Charter was not given treaty status at
Nice, primarily because of the resistance of the U.K. and four other
governments, but "it was 'solemnly proclaimed' at Nice by the Council, EP
[European Parliament] and Commission."152  Thus, its current legal status is
unclear. 153 It was dropped into the Constitution in one piece as Part II of the
draft Constitution.
Much has already been written about the Charter.154 It may well be the
most controversial part of the Constitution, not because of the rights guaranteed,
but because the mode of enforcement and the status of constitutional protection
vary widely within individual states. As one commentator noted, "[s]ignificant
difficulties will have to be overcome to find a consensus on the role fundamental
rights should play as constitutional limitations to legislative and executive
powers, on their inherent balance between individual and general interests and
on their judicial protection."' 155 The constitutional traditions of the constituent
European states vary widely, from the grand British experience to the newest
(1944)). The "separation of powers" dispute is probably too "American" for the European Union at
this time.
150. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-33, para. 1, at 27.
151. Id.
152. NUGENT, supra note 24, at 91.
153. Thomas von Danwitz, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Between
Political Symbolism and Legal Realism, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 289, 290 (2001); see also
Agustfn Jos6 Men~ndez, Chartering Europe: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, Arena Working Papers, (Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Nova de Lisboa Francisco
Lucas Pires Working Papers Series on European Constitutionalism, Working Paper 2001/03),
available at http://www.fd.unl.pt/je/wpflp03a.doc (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
154. See, e.g., von Danwitz, supra note 153; see also Joseph R. Wetzel, Note, Improving
Fundamental Rights Protection in the European Union: Resolving the Conflict and Confusion
Between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2823 (2003); Dinah
Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95
(2003); Giorgio Sacerdoti, The European Charter of Fundamental Rights: From a Nation-State
Europe to a Citizens' Europe, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 37 (2002).
155. von Danwitz, supra note 153, at 290.
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applicant states from Eastern Europe and beyond. Even among established
members there is much confusion.
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands do not operate a system of
constitutional jurisdiction and even under the French concept of preventive
constitutional control, statutory laws are still largely conceived as volonte
gdnral .... Therefore the Conseil constitutionnel is generally tempted to a
significant extent to uphold parliamentary statutes against Fundamental Right
claims.
156
It may be that the intent of the Constitution is that the Charter shall protect
individual rights in much the same way that the American Bill of Rights does, as
a list of things the government may not do. The constitutionally limiting nature
of the Charter is seemingly made clear by Part I of the Constitution, which
provides in Article 1-9 that "[t]he Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part
11." 1V The same article goes on to state in typically dense fashion:
[flundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute
general principles of the Union's law. 1
58
The Primacy Clause, which states that "[t]he Constitution and law adopted
by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall
have primacy over the law of the Member States."'159  This, taken with the
broadening jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, seems to indicate that the Charter
will likely have growing significance in years to come.
It remains to take a brief look at some of the specific provisions of the
Charter and compare them to the U.S. Bill of Rights. 0 At first glance, the
Charter is broader than the American version. The Charter contains fifty-four
articles, and its provisions range from the expansive and aspirational161 to some
surprisingly specific and direct provisions.' 6 2  Some mirror closely the
156. Id. at291.
157. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-9, para. 1, at 13.
158. Id. art. 1-9, para. 3, at 13 (emphasis added).
159. Id. art. 1-6, at 12.
160. We must resist the urge to enter the debate over the precise content of the U.S. Bill of
Rights. For our purposes, a loose definition including Amendments I-X, XIII, XIV, and XV will
suffice. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X, XIII-XV.
161. "Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected." Constitution for Europe,
supra note 22, art. 11-61, at 42.
162. For example:
The employment of children is prohibited. The minimum age of admission to
employment may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age, without
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protections of the U.S. Bill of Rights, while others are new and perhaps
surprising.
Both the Charter and the U.S. Bill of Rights came into existence with a long
and detailed ancestry already in place. Some of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights can be traced to earlier American documents such as the Virginia
Declaration of Rights or the Mayflower Compact, while others trace their lineage
to English history and rights from the Magna Charta forward. American
founding fathers, legislators, and judges had reference points from which to infer
meaning for the Bill of Rights. Those same founders, legislators, and judges
spoke (and speak) a common tongue. This common history and common
language serve us well with interpretation of the sparse language of the Bill of
Rights.
The same is much less true for the framers of the Charter and the judges
who will enforce it. There is little or no judicial gloss on the Charter since it has
been in existence for such a short time, and its legal effect remains in doubt.
European national experiences with civil rights and liberties vary a great deal.
The British experience with human rights and individual freedoms is far
different from that of Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic, or - perhaps in the
near future - Turkey. For example, freedom of thought, conscience and
religion 163 implies something quite different in each of those cultures. The
difference in language and translation is equally important. The translation of
the term "liberty ' 64 or other terms in each of the twenty-one official languages
may have at best some unexpected implications and shades of meaning.
Of course, the provisions of the Charter do have substantial meaning. As
our Bill of Rights grew largely from our revolutionary experience, the emphasis
of the Charter grew from the experiences of post-war Europe. Issues of
immigration, citizenship, social welfare and solidarity seem to predominate,
while American issues such as quartering of troops and the right to bear arms are
absent. Each issue grew from the needs and experiences of each new nation.
European judges and lawyers will interpret the Charter in the light of those needs
and experiences, as American judges and lawyers have done.
Some of the parallel provisions between the Charter and the American Bill
of Rights include: "[p]rohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment
prejudice to such rules as may be more favourable to young people and except
for limited derogations,
Young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to
their age and be protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to
harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or to
interfere with their education.
Id. art. 11-92, at 48.
163. Id. art. 1-70, at 44.
164. Id. art. 11-66, at 43.
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or punishment"; 6 5 prohibition of slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labor,
and trafficking in human beings; 166 "right to liberty and security of person";
167
"freedom of thought, conscience and religion"; 6 1 freedom of expression,
including "freedom and pluralism of the media";169 and "[f]reedom of assembly
and of association"; 170 the right to roperty; t 7 1 freedom from discrimination on
any ground;172 the right to vote; right to fair and speedy trial, and to legal
assistance; 174 the presumption of innocence; 175 and freedom from double
jeopardy. 176
The right of privacy, "found" by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,177 is reflected to some degree in Article 11-67, which provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home
and communications." 178 Two American amendments have no parallel within
the Charter: the Second Amendment's right to bear arms, and the Third
Amendment's limitations on the quartering of troops are simply not present.1
79
165. Id. art. 11-64, at 42; accord U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
166. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22 art. 11-65, at 43; accord U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
167. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22 art. 11-66, at 43; accord U.S. CONST. amends. V &
XI.
168. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22 art. 11-70, at 44; accord U.S. CONST. amend. I. This
article includes the freedom "to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance" and also specifically recognizes the right to conscientious objection "in accordance
with the national laws governing the exercise of this right." Constitution for Europe, supra note 22
art. 11-70, at 44.
169. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22 art. 11-7 1, para. 2, at 44; accord U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
170. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22 art. 11-72, at 44; accord U.S. CoNsY. amend. 1.
171. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22 art. 1-77, at 45; accord U.S. CONST. amends. V &
XIV.
172. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22 arts. 11-80 & 11-81, at 46; accord U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. The prohibition against discrimination extends to "any ground such as sex, race, colour,
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion,
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation . "
Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11-81, para. 1, at 46. In addition, Art. 11-83 provides
"feiquality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work
and pay." Constitution for Europe, supra note 22 art. 11-83, at 46.
173. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, arts. 11-99 & II-100, at 50; accord U.S. CONST.
amend. XV.
174. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11-107, at 52; accord U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
175. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11-108, at 52.
176. Id. art. 11-110, at 52.; accord U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
177. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
178. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11-67, at 43.
179. See U.S. CONST. amends. II & HII.
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The Charter also contains a number of provisions that may seem alien to
American constitutional lawyers. Those provisions include a specific provision
stating that "[e]veryone has the right to life,"'180 followed immediately by a
prohibition of the death penalty; 18 1 provisions guaranteeing respect for physical
and mental integrity, and requiring free and informed consent to medical
procedures and prohibiting eugenic practices and reproductive cloning,
182
protection of personal data; 183 protection of the right to marry and found a
family, 184 the right to education,185 to choose an occupation and engage in186 • 187
work, and to conduct a business. An interesting provision provides that
"[t]he arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint [and requires that]
[a]cademic freedom shall be respected."' 188  Specific provisions deal with the
right to asylum, 189and others protect the rights of children, 19 the elderly, 191 and
persons with disabilities. 
19 2
An entire chapter is entitled "Solidarity," and includes provisions regarding
collective bargaining,193 placement services,19 4 protection against unjustified
dismissal, 19 5 protection of fair and just working conditions, 196 and family and
professional life (including protection against dismissal for maternity leave and
guaranteeing paid maternity and parental leave). 197 The same chapter provides
protection of social security benefits and social services in cases of "maternity,
illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of
employment"' 198 and provides that "[e]veryone has the right of access topreventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment."19 9 This
180. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11-62, para. 1, at 42.
181. Id. art. 11-62, para. 2, at 42. Of course the two Due Processes protect "life, liberty and
property." U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
182. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. I-63, at 42.
183. Id. art. 11-68, at 43.
184. Id. art. 11-69, at 43.
185. Id. art. 1H-74, at 44.
186. Id. art. 11-75, at 45.
187. Id. art. 11-76, at 45.
188. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. II-73, at 44.
189. Id. art. 11-78, at 45.
190. Id. art. 11-84, at 46.
191. Id. art. 11-85, at 47.
192. Id. art. 11-86, at 47.
193. Id. art. II-88, at 47.
194. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11-89, at 47.
195. Id. art. 11-90, at 48.
196. Id. art. 11-91, at 48.
197. Id. art. 11-93, at 48.
198. Id. art. 11-94, para. 1, at 48.
199. Id. art. II-95, at 49.
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requires that "[a] high level of human health protection shall be ensured."20 0
Similarly, the same chapter requires environmental20 1 and consumer protection
at a high level.
202
Finally, in a chapter entitled "Citizens' Rights," the Charter protects the
right to vote and stand as a candidate, and in the case of the European
Parliament, it requires "direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot."
20 3
One of the longest articles provides a right to good administration and provides
access to and accountability of Union bureaucrats.
20 4
It seems clear that the Charter is primarily intended to protect against EU
actions, just as the original ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution originally
applied only to actions of the federal government. 205  In Article 11-111 the
provisions of the Charter "are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the
Member States only when they are implementing Union law." 20 6 It is just as
clear that the Charter does not refer to private action.
In general, the aims of the Charter are very similar to those of the American
Bill of Rights. Both aim to protect the citizen from arbitrary acts of the central
government and both contain broad language that might extend protections to
actions of the component states. The specific protections include virtually all of
the protections of the American Constitution, at least in broad strokes, but go
much further. The aims of the Charter also include what appear to be some
extremely detailed (and to Americans, controversial) social welfare
protections and guarantees. Each reflects the society that created it: in one case,
post-revolutionary America of the late 18th century, in the other, post-cold war
Europe of the early 21st century.
E. The Commerce Power
American constitutional scholars have long debated the meaning of Article
I, Section 8, clause 3 of the American Constitution: "[t]he Congress shall have
200. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11-95, at 49.
201. Id. art. 11-97, at 49.
202. Id. art. 11-98, at 49.
203. Id. art. 11-99, para. 2, at 49.
204. Id. art. 11-101, at 50.
205. See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Of course that
limitation was effectively overruled by Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) and its
introduction of the selective incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
clause.
206. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11- 111, para. 1, at 53.
207. This is not to say that the generous social welfare provisions largely available in Europe are
accepted without comment by Europeans as well. While typically more generous than available
anywhere in the U.S., they remain somewhat controversial in many European venues.
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Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States ... ,208 These few words have provided the soil for much constitutional
law regarding the relative powers of the federal government and the states over
commerce. Indeed, they have provided the source for most federal regulation of
the economy and beyond. The American Commerce Clause has two chief
functions: (1) it has provided the source of constitutional power and authority for
innumerable federal actions; and (2) it has limited the ability of states to either
discriminate against interstate commerce or unduly burden interstate
209
commerce.
The EU Constitution does not provide a single broad grant of power similar
to the American Commerce Clause. The Europeans have instead attacked the
problem piecemeal, by establishing a common commercial policy based upon a
customs union between the Member States. For fifty years, the central purpose
of European integration has been to abolish tariffs between Member States and
present a common commercial front to the rest of the world. 2 1  European laws
are to be used to establish the common commercial policy.
21 1
An entire chapter of Title III of the Constitution deals with the internal
market:
212
2. The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in
which the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital is ensured in
accordance with the Constitution.
213
3. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt European
regulations and decisions determining the guidelines and conditions necessary
to ensure balanced progress in all the sectors concerned.
2 14
Also, Member States are required to consult with each other in the event of
serious internal disturbance, war or the threat of war.
2 15
The EU Constitution seeks to avoid the long debate on the relative
allocation of power between the federal government and the state governments
on commercial matters by dealing with "commerce" in a much more specific
manner. Separate sections of Title III, Chapter I deal with free movement of
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
209. In large measure the impetus for a change in the American Articles of Confederation came
from that document's inability to stop individual states from favoring internal commerce over that
from other states. In many ways the Common Market, the economic forerunner of the EU, was
created from similar motives.
210. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. Itt-314, at 142.
211. Id. art. II-315, at 142-43.
212. Id. tit. III, ch. I, at 58-173.
213. Id. art. H1-130, para. 2, at 58.
214. Id. art. 1II-130, para. 3, at58.
215. Id. art. 1II-131,at 58.
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persons and Services; 2 16 free movement of goods; 217 capital and Payments;
218
rules on competition; 2 19 and fiscal provisions. 22  An important section provides
that "European laws or framework laws shall establish measures for the
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and
functioning of the internal market.
'221
A great deal of authority is given to the EU to implement the free and open
internal market through either European laws or framework laws. Important
grants of power to the federal government are given to regulate and guarantee
free movement of persons and services, capital and payments, and goods through
European laws or framework laws. Section Five is nearly as specific as all of the
American antitrust laws,222 and goes much further to prohibit many forms of
Member State assistance to domestic industries.
2 23
While it appears that substantial authority is given to the central EU
government, two overriding issues may somewhat enhance the power of
Member States. First, the Constitution often grants authority to the EU to deal
with a specific area, but only by establishment of European framework laws.
224
As noted above, a European framework law is binding on the Member States "as
to the result to be achieved," but leaves the national authorities "the choice of
form and methods" of achieving that result. 225 Thus, Member States have the
authority, within the guidelines established by the framework laws, to enact
specific legislation tailored to the needs and desires of each State.
216. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. III § 2, at 59.
217. Id. art. III, § 3, at 64.
218. Id. art. III, § 4, at 66.
219. Id. art. 111, § 5, at 68.
220. Id. art. III, § 6, at 73.
221. Id. art. 111-172, para. 1, at 73.
222. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. III § 5, at 68. The EU has been particularly
active in its enforcement of antitrust laws, more so than American antitrust authorities.
International companies that must comply with the "highest common denominator" of antitrust
laws often look to European enforcement authorities as their frame of reference.
223. For instance:
Save as otherwise provided in the Constitution, any aid granted by a Member
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member
States, be incompatible with the internal market.
Id. art. 111-167, para. 1, at 71.
224. For example, art. 111-147 provides that "European framework laws shall establish measures
to achieve the liberalisation of a specific service." Id. art. 111-147, para. 1, at 64. There are
numerous other examples throughout Title III, Chapter 1.
225. Id. art. 1-33, para. 1, at 27.
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Second, the long-standing doctrine of subsidiarity guarantees that actions
should be taken at the lowest possible level. Thus, outside of the constitutional
grants of authority to the EU, the general rule will be that power should be
exercised by the Member States if at all possible.
The European power over commercial matters is not likely to evolve in the
same way that the American commerce power has done. The specificity of the
powers granted are likely to be restricted to purely commercial undertakings,
rather than acting as the fount and origin of vast power for the central
government. The Commerce Clause has provided the source of power for much
of American regulation today in the areas of competition, including
environmental legislation, labor law, securities transactions, and even anti-
discrimination law. Each of those areas and more are expressly considered in the
European Constitution. Therefore, it is likely that the European commercial
power will remain just that - power over commercial policy, limited by the
principle of subsidiarity.
F. The Power to Tax and Union Finances
The power to tax is neither specifically granted nor denied in the
Constitution. Article 1-54 provides that "[t]he Union shall provide itself with the
means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies. ' 226 The
same provision provides that a European law of the Council "may establish new
categories of own resources." 227  However, that law must be approved in
accordance with Member States' respective constitutional requirements, and
requires unanimous action of the Council of Ministers after consultation with the
European Parliament.
A balanced budget is required. 228 The budgetary process is done through a
multiannual financial framework and an annual budget.229 The multiannual
framework is provided by the Council "after obtaining the consent of the
European Parliament" provided by a majority of the Parliament.230 The first
multiannual financial framework after entry into force of the Constitution must
be adopted by the European Council unanimously.
231
Currently the budget of the Union is relatively small. In 2002, it totaled
E98.6 billion, representing just over one percent of the GNP of the member
states and which is less than three percent of their total annual public
226. Id. art. t-54, para. 1, at 37.
227. Id. art. 1-54, para. 3, at 37.
228. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-53, para. 2, at 36.
229. Id. art. 1-55, at 37; see also id. art. 111-402, at 174.
230. Id. art. 1-54, para. 4, at 37.
231. Id. art. 1-54, para. 3, at 37.
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expenditure. 232  This budget is small because few of the policy areas that
traditionally make up the bulk of public expenditures are controlled by the
EU. 233 Expensive government operations such as defense, education, health, and
social welfare all remain largely within the jurisdiction of the Member States. 234
The revenue of the EU currently comes from four principle sources: (1)
common customs tariff and other duties; 235 (2) "[a]gricultural levies, premiums
and other duties, which are collected in respect of trade with non-member
countries within the framework of the [Common Agricultural Policy] CAP";236
(3) a uniform VAT assessment to each nation, standardized but still permitting
each nation some variation in VAT rates; and (4) an assessment based on the
sum of Member States GNPs at market prices. The latter is very much like a
national contribution based on relative GNP, based on the ability to pay.
237
The issue of direct taxation is currently being avoided. As the level of
activity by the central authority the EU increases, it is likely that the need for
resources will increase. The need for resources will inevitably spur debate over
the appropriate methods of funding the EU and over the appropriate use of
funds. This sort of issue was another of the chief problems with the American
Articles of Confederation, which depended on voluntary state contributions for
most of its revenue. The EU, if it is to become a viable political entity, must
obtain authority to directly obtain resources sufficient to support its activities.
G. Legislation, Specificity, and the Amendment Process
The Constitution includes a significant number of sections dealing with
areas that would appear to be non-constitutional in significance. Part III, Title
III, entitled Internal Policies and Actions, deals, in Chapter III, with a number of
very specific areas including employment, social policy, the environment,
consumer protection, transport, and energy, among others. While the
constitutional coverage of those issues is often less complete than full legislative
enactments would be, it often involves far more detail than American
constitutional lawyers would expect. Provisions often involve limitations on
either Union or Member State activities or the establishment of procedures to
deal with special problems in the area. Normally, the provisions establish goals
232. NUGENT, supra note 24, at 366. For comparison purposes, the budget of the State of Illinois
alone for FY 03 was $23.3 billion.
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. id. at 370.
236. Id. at 393(These "are not fixed import taxes, but are fluctuating charges designed to have the
effect of raising import prices to EU levels.").
237. Id. at 370-71. "The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)--essentially a program of farm
subsidies and price guarantees--comprises almost 50 percent of the EU's overall budget."
KUPCHAN, supra note 3, at 147-48.
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for the area in broad and ambiguous terms,238 limitations on what the EU may do
regarding the area,239 and how the laws governing the area are to be enacted.
24 0
Inclusion of these specific legislative areas in the Constitution has both
advantages and disadvantages. These provisions are clearly meant to provide
guidance and avoid disputes later. Often, they have been lifted intact from hard-
won treaties or other agreements, and constitutional authors are probably loathe
to erase months or years of negotiations. On the other hand, these specific
238. For example, art. 111-233 provides that:
1. Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the
following objectives:
(a) preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment;
(b) protecting human health;
(c) prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources;
(d) promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide
environmental problems.
Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 111-233, para. 1, at 103.
239. For example, art. 111-233 provides that:
3. In preparing its policy on the environment, the Union shall take account of:
(a) available scientific and technical data;
(b) environmental conditions in the various regions of the Union;
(c) the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action;
(d) the economic and social development of the Union as a whole and the
balanced development of its regions.
Id. art. 111-233, para. 3, at 103.
240. For example, art. Il-234 provides that:
1. European laws or framework laws shall establish what action is to be taken in
order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 111-233. They shall be
adopted after consultation of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic
and Social Committee.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1 ... the Council shall unanimously
adopt European laws or framework laws establishing:
(a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;
(b) measures affecting:
(i) town and country planning;
(ii) quantitative management of water resources...;
(iii) land use, with the exception of waste management;
(c) measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different
energy sources ....
The Council ... may unanimously adopt a European decision making the
ordinary legislative procedure applicable ....
In all cases, the Council shall act after consulting the European Parliament, the
Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee.
Id. art. 111-234, paras. 1-2, at 104.
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provisions tie the hands of future legislators. The constitutional provisions
require that legislators consider certain policies, follow certain procedures and be
bound by certain limitations for all time. If policies change, the political forces
shift, or priorities are altered, the constitutional provisions still remain.
Constitutional specificity becomes extremely important in the light of the
procedures for revision and amendment of the Constitution. Article IV-443
provides that an amendment requires a constitutional convention to be convened
by the President of the European Council following consultation with the
European Parliament and the Commission and a majority vote of the European
Council.241  The convention is composed of representatives of the national
Parliaments of the Member States, of the Heads of State of the Members States,
the European Parliament, and the Commission. The convention adopts "by
consensus" a recommendation for the Member States. 242 The conference of
representatives of the governments of the Member States also determines by
common accord the amendments to be made.243  The amendments become
effective after ratification by all of "the Member States in accordance with their
respective constitutional requirements."
244
The procedure for amendment is substantially more difficult than amending
the U.S. Constitution. While there is no specific supermajority rule in the
Parliament, the convention, or the conference of representatives, the requirement
of a "consensus" or a "common accord" imply near unanimity. The procedure
clearly requires unanimity for ratification by the Member States. This burden is
substantially higher than the two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress and
three-fourths of the States that was required for the twenty-six amendments in
214 years for the United States.
245
The hidden danger here is that the European Constitution will become out-
of-date and unworkable as foundational law for Europe. Popular and progressive
provisions in the first years of the twenty-first century may quickly become
archaic, or even counter-productive, a decade or two later. Amendment is at best
slow and clumsy, and at worst, impossible.
There are only two real solutions. Either the Constitution must become less
specific, granting substantial freedom to European legislators to fashion laws for
their time in history and trusting in the courts and the legislatures themselves to
241. Id. art. IV-443, para. 2, at 189-90.
242. Id.
243. Id. art. IV-443, para. 3, at 189-90.
244. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. IV-445, para. 2, at 191. A "Simplified Revision
Procedure" is provided by Article IV-444, wherein the European Council may adopt a European
decision authorizing the Council to act by a qualified majority in certain cases, followed by
notification to national parliaments and the opportunity by those parliaments to object, thereby
eliminating the need for a convention, but not the need for unanimity. Id. art. IV-444, at 191.
245. U.S. CONST. art. V.
2005]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
keep within the banks of constitutional policy; or the procedures for amendment
within the constitution must become far more efficient. In either case, European
constitutionalists must trust in their future legislative and political counterparts.
H. The Requirement of a Market Economy and European Social Policies
One of the most obvious tensions in the document relates to the
requirements of both a market economy and Euro-style social welfare and
employment philosophy. A number of provisions refer to "an open market, • ,246
economy with free competition. The Constitution prohibits excessive
government deficits, 247 defines them, and even provides a method of measuring
deficits and an enforcement mechanism for dealing with Member States that run
such deficits.248 It seems that Thatcherism is the dominant economic philosophy
behind the new Constitution.
249
However, the explicit choice of a market economy in the new constitution
is belied by provisions which support, or even require, a traditional European
welfare state. Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, for example,
provide for the right to property, but then provide that the "use of property may
be regulated by law insofar as is necessary for the general interest.' Another
article protects a limitation on "maximum working hours, to daily and weekly
rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave," 51 while others prohibit child
labor,252 protect paid maternity and parental leave, 253 protect entitlement to
246. See Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 111-177, at 76; see also id. art. 111-178, at 76.
247. Id. art. 111- 184, para. 1, at 78.
248. Id. art. 111-184, at 78-81.
249. Contrary to arguments by American economic conservatives, there is no such choice of
economic systems in the American constitution. Perhaps the clearest exposition of this fact was
found in Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner v. New York:
But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even
shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905). The triumvirate of decisions in 1937 affirming federal and state power
to regulate commerce also implied that a market economy was not constitutionally mandated. E.g.,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). It would appear that the constitutional
choice of a market economy based on competition may be a limiting factor on choices to be made
in the future, both by the EU and by Member States. However, the definition of a "market
economy" will certainly vary substantially.
250. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11-77, para. 1, at 45.
251. Id. art. 11-91, para. 2, at 48.
252. Id. art. 11-92, at 48.
253. Id. art. 11-93, at 48.
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social security benefits and social services "in cases such as maternity, illness,
industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of
employment, ''254 and protect access to preventative health care. 255 Proponents of
laissez faire market economics would find each one anathema.
Aside from the requirements of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, there
are significant portions of the Constitution dealing with employment and social
policies that guarantee workers' rights and assure equal opportunities and
treatment, social security, and workers' health and safety. 25 6 This tension may
be more illusory than real. The requirement of a market economy is broad and
general at best, while the provisions requiring labor and social protections are
quite specific. It will be easy - and probably politic - to give lip service to the
market economy while providing social and labor protections consistent with the
last half century of European history. Those free market provisions are more
likely provided as assurance against any sort of communist or outright socialist-
style economic systems, rather than as stringent requirements for adoption of
laissez faire economic systems.
L Sovereignty, Foreign Affairs and Defense
Underlying the entire European constitutional process is the issue of the
effect of the Constitution on "sovereignty." At the outset, sovereignty is a
surprisingly difficult concept to define.2 57 The term has been defined by the
U.S. Supreme Court as "the Supreme, absolute, and incontrolable, power of
Government" by which any independent state is governed. 258  It is also
sometimes used to mean international independence, or the right and power of
regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation.
259
One way to look at sovereignty is like property, as a "bundle of rights."
Sovereignty consists of a series of national powers, including the right to close
borders and exclude others, the right to coin money, the right to deal with its
own citizens, the right to raise armies, and the right to be recognized
internationally as an independent state, among others. Just as the rights of
ownership of property can be divided and dispersed (possession, the right to use,
254. Id. art. 11-94, at 48.
255. Id. art. 11-95, at 49.
256. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 111-203, at 91; see also id. art. 111-210, at 93.
257. Cf, Ian Ward, The End of Sovereignty and the New Humanism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2091
(2003) (comparing the concepts of unlimited or "parliamentary" sovereignty, as exemplified by the
strongest British traditions and described at length by Albert Venn Dicey in his Introduction to the
Study of the Law of the Constitution, and the concepts of dualist sovereignty, as described by Lord
Denning in McCarthy's v. Smith, 1981 Q.B. 180, which provided for limited sovereignty within
the context of greater European sovereignty).
258. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419,461 (1793).
259. See generally Moore v. Shaw, 17 Cal. 218 (1861); State v. Dixon, 213 P. 227 (Mont. 1923).
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the right to receive profits, etc.), the rights of sovereignty can be divided and
dispersed. For example, by giving up the right to close borders or coin money.
Regardless of the definition, the problem of sovereignty presents issues and
undercurrents for the whole issue of EU federalism. Those issues threaten both
the idea of Europe and the ability of the EU to function as a single entity in some
of its most important aspects. Perhaps the most important and the most
vulnerable aspect deals with foreign relations.
One of the most dramatic episodes implicating sovereignty is being played
out in the European Court of Justice. EU Commission Rules require that
national budget deficits be capped at three percent of gross domestic product.
France and Germany flouted those rules in 2002, 2003, and again in 2004. The
European Union voted to suspend the rules, since they would have forced France
and Germany to make deep budget cuts which threatened economic recovery.
The Commission sued the fifteen members who voted in favor of suspending the
rules. 260  It was clear that "'Germany and France wanted to make a
point, namely that they can't be pushed around by the comnission."'261  A
defeat would weaken the commission's position, even though smaller members
have acceded to the commission's power.262
The most compelling issues of sovereignty involve foreign affairs. The
Constitution attempts to deal with external relations in a number of provisions.
Both Article I and Article III provide for a common foreign and security policy
in slightly different contexts and wording.263 The policy is to be defined and
adopted by the European Council,264 but is to be implemented by the Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs (who also chairs the Council of Ministers for
Foreign Affairs and represents the Union on matters relating to the common
foreign and security policy). 265 "[T]he Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall
260. Mark Landler, European Commission to Sue Over Deficits of 2 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2004, at Cl.
261. Id.
262. Id. On March 21, 2005, EU finance ministers agreed to revamp the Stability and Growth
Pact to allow more flexibility in the rules and permit a number of factors that will excuse a
Member State from complying with the Pact. Exact wording of the changes had not been
established. EU reaches budget deficit deal, CNN.cOM, Mar. 21, 2005, at
http://www.cnn.com/2005JBUSINESS/03/21/eu.pact.reut/?section=cnn-latest (last visited Mar. 31,
2005).
263. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 1-40, para. 1, at 29; see also id. art. 111-294, at
133.
264. Id. art. 111-295, at 134.
265. Id. art. 111-296, para. 1, at 134; see also id. art. 1-28, at 23.
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be assisted by a European External Action Service, ' 266 which seems to be the
Union's version of an EU diplomatic corps.
2 6 7
The creation of foreign policy is cumbersome at best. If "operational
action" by the Union is required, the necessary European decisions are adopted
by the Council, consisting of a representative of each Member State at the
ministerial level. Such actions are to be adopted by the Council unanimously,
although abstentions do not prevent adoption of the decisions unless at least one-
third of the Member States representing one-third of the population of the Union
have abstained.268 "[T]he Council shall act by qualified majority" in certain
instances, especially if the European Council has already acted.269 Likewise, the
European Council (consisting of the Heads of State or Government of all
Member States) may adopt European decisions, again unanimously. 270
The relation of Member States and their foreign activities are, of course,
vital to these issues. The Constitution is full of precatory phrases, arguing that
the common foreign and security policy should be "based on the development of
mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions
of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of
convergence of Member States' actions,'271 and requiring that Member States
"consult one another ... on any foreign and security policy issue which is of
general interest" and shows mutual solidarity. 272 Similarly, "[t]he Member
States shall support the common foreign and security policy actively and
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity," and "[t]hey shall
refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to
impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations."
274
Member states are required to "coordinate their action in international
organisations and at international conferences."
275
On the other hand, realities are recognized in a provision that requires that:
[t]he policy of the Union ... shall not prejudice the specific character of the
security and defence policy of certain Member States, it shall respect the
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence
realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under the North Atlantic
266. Id. art. Ii-296, para. 3, at 134.
267. Draft Treaty, supra note 32, at 239.
268. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 111-300, para. 1, at 135.
269. Id. art. 111-300, para. 2, at 136.
270. Id. art. 1-40, at 29-30; see also id. art. 111-293, para. 1, at 133-34.
271. Id. art. 1-40, para. 1, at 29.
272. Id. art. 1-40, para. 5, at 30.
273. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 111-294, para. 2, at 133.
274. Id.
275. Id. art. 111-305, para. 1, at 137.
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Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defence policy
established within that framework. 276
The military means on which Union policies are ultimately dependent is to
be provided by the Member States, who are to "make civilian and military
capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common
security and defence policy."277 Member States are also required to "undertake
progressively to improve their military capabilities," and a European Defense
Agency is created to aid in the development of those capabilities.
European military operations in recent years have largely been concentrated
in peace-keeping operations and conflict resolution, even though Europe has
many more soldiers in uniform than the United States.279 However, it is likely
that the European military presence will increase in the future. 28  Substantial
reforms are being made in national military programs, including collective
procurement systems and the phasing out of universal military service in favor of
a more professional military in France and Germany. 28 1 The ability to create a
common security policy, and the need for a coordinated military presence on the
fringes of Europe to deal with emerging trouble areas will likely goad the
Europeans toward a flexible military as an arm of its new coordinated foreign
policy.
2 82
The Europeans have adopted what appears to be a very pragmatic and
incremental approach to sovereignty. Rather than creating one large cataclysmic
event in which centuries-old nations yield their sovereign swords to the EU, the
Europeans have taken small steps, each involving small incidents of sovereignty.
Open borders, commercial cooperation, the Euro, and now a common foreign
and security policy all lead to the conclusion that the bundle of rights of
sovereignty is being divided between Member States and the EU. It seems likely
that the division will continue.
J. Ratification
As discussed earlier, the ratification process is itself somewhat unclear.
Article IV-447 provides that:
1. This Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance
with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of
ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Italian Republic.
276. Id. art. 1-41, para. 2, at 31.
277. id. art. 1-41, para. 3, at 31.
278. Id.
279. See KuPCHAN, supra note 3, at 148.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 149.
282. Id.
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2. This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 November 2006, provided that all
the instruments of ratification have been deposited, or, failing that, on the first
day of the second month following the deposit of the instrument of ratification283
by the last signatory State to take this step.
However, an earlier provision in Article IV-443 (4) states: "[i]f, two years
after the signature of the treaty amending this Treaty, four fifths of the Member
States have ratified it and one or more Member States have encountered
difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the matter shall be referred to the
European Council." 284 This has been interpreted to mean that there is a two year
limit on the ratification process, and if it has not been adopted unanimously, "the
European Council will review the situation."
285
The Conventions' Draft Constitution was the subject of the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that began in the fall of 2003. The IGC
brought together the representatives of the governments of the fifteen current
member states and the ten acceding countries. Three candidate states (Bulgaria,
Romania and Turkey), had observer status. The objective was that the IGC
complete its work prior to the European Parliamentary elections on June 15,
2004. A further objective, was to have the Constitution signed as quickly as
possible after May 1, 2004, the date of accession of the ten new Member States.
According to the terms of the Draft, the Member States would then have to ratify
the Treaty in accordance with their existing constitutional rules.
286
Clearly, this process was not followed. The vote on December 15, 2003
meant that the draft went back for reconsideration and restructuring. A
compromise document emerged, but one that may be capable of pulling together
the diverse strands of European politics into a single document. Whatever the
result, the current draft will form the backbone of any new effort at federalizing
Europe.
On January 1, 2004, the presidency of the European Union rotated from
Italy to Prime Minister Bertie Ahem of Ireland. Immediately, a new debate
began between Ahem and Romano Prodi of Italy, the President of the European
Commission. Mr. Prodi argued for what has been termed a "two-speed" Europe,
in which some parts of Europe would adopt the Constitution or something like it,
while other parts of Europe would join at later times. Mr. Ahem argued that any
"new talks must include all members, including 10 new nations set to join in
283. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. IV-447, at 191.
284. Id. art. IV-443, para. 4, at 190.
285. Draft Constitution: Citizens' Guide: Presentation to Citizens, 27, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
SECRETARIAT GENERAL, available at
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May."' 287 Those talks indeed involved all of the acceding members, sometimes
to the consternation of the original members of the EU.
The politics of ratification are at two levels. At the EU level, much of the
political infighting is now concluded, and the document has been nominally
accepted by each of the governments of the twenty-five Member States. This in
itself is a significant accomplishment and perhaps a high point in European
politics in the last 2000 years. The politics of ratification now moves largely to
the domestic politics in each of the Member States. A key issue remains the so-
called "democratic deficit" - the general lack of interest and concern by the
European public with the workings of the European Union. Significant numbers
of Europeans are "euroskeptics," that is, they see little to gain and much to lose
by ceding sovereignty or a part of sovereignty to what is largely seen as an
undemocratic bureaucracy in Brussels. 288 Many nations that will ratify through
a referendum, including some of the largest and most influential nations in
Europe, must first overcome some fairly basic prejudice against European
federalization.
The sheer size and complexity of the Constitution adds to the democratic
deficit. It will be a rare European who actually reads the entire document. The
300 plus pages are, as a practical matter, inaccessible to all but the most intrepid
voters, and contributes to the image of the EU as a complex, dense and
inaccessible bureaucracy. It is far easier to vote against such an organization
than to vote for it.
The ratification process will involve more local politics than grand designs
for Europe. The interests of Poles, Swedes, Spaniards and Irishmen will all
weigh in on the future of Europe, each considering its own parochial interests in
the context of a broad vision for Europe. The requirement for unanimity will
likely result in delays and setbacks.
VIII. PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICIES
It is easy for Americans, jaundiced by decades of political divisiveness,
media posturing, and political ambitions to be cynical about the prospects for
European federation. 289 The very existence of the Draft Constitution implies
that Europeans have, at least for now, agreed to set aside at least some
differences for the greater good of all. Those nations, or many of them, have
287. Brian Lavery, European Officials Meet on Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2004, at Al 0.
288. Joschka Fischer, Germany's Foreign Minister and a moving force toward integration,
"admitted, the EU is often 'viewed as a bureaucratic affair run by a faceless, soulless Eurocracy in
Brussels at best boring, at worst dangerous."' Joschka Fischer, From Confederacy to Federation -
Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration, Speech at Humboldt University, Berlin (May 12,
2000), quoted in KUPCHAN, supra note 3, at 141.
289. Cf., Jeffrey E. Garten, Europe: Staring Into The Abyss, BuS. WEEK, Aug. 2, 2004, at 24.
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come together many times in the past for purposes of the various Treaties of
Rome, Amsterdam, Nice, and Maastricht, as well as for the Single European Act
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. There is reason to believe that even this
massive restructuring could be successful.
American lawyers who are comfortable with the ambiguities of the
American Constitution will nonetheless be ill at ease with some of the
conditional, exhortative, and equivocal language of the EU constitution. Perhaps
the single most difficult phrase requires "a high level" of protection of various
rights or liberties. For example, the Charter requires "[a] high level of
environmental protection," 290 and "a high level of consumer protection."
29 1
American environmentalists and consumer advocates would applaud the
concepts even finding their way into the constitution, but lawyers and judges
who must decide specific cases will assuredly have difficulty defining a "high
level."
292
While the European Constitution is ambiguous, perhaps it needs to be. The
American Constitution was developed for people who spoke a common language
and was developed in one language (only for transplanted Englishmen). The
European Constitution was translated into twenty-four languages on the official
website. It was developed for Germans, Spaniards, Greeks, Italians,
Englishmen, Lithuanians, Latvians, and perhaps Turks, among others. The
meaning of "a high level" and other phrases is likely to have slightly different
shades of meaning in French, Polish, and Portuguese. How all this will unfold in
a judicial setting, or a legislative one, is not clear.
The potential implications for American foreign policy of increasing
European integration and the potential for real political federation are staggering.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States continues to be the sole
power center in the international arena. Admittedly, the United States' response
to this level of responsibility has been schizophrenic, shifting from isolationism
to unilateralism, and often blending the two in curious combinations. However,
American policymakers have at least accepted and guarded their role as the sole
repository of international power.
A united Europe, with its economy, population, and more genuine
international outlook, has the potential to challenge American global primacy in
the long run.293 While military confrontation between the EU and the U.S. is
290. Constitution for Europe, supra note 22, art. 11-97, at 49.
291. Id. art. 11-98, at 49.
292. Other provisions require "a high level of employment." Id. art. 111-205, at 70.
293. Kupchan presents the interesting analogy of the division of the Roman Empire, then the
"unipolar" power center of the world, into eastern and western zones (Rome and Byzantium) by
Diocletian in the third century, the consequent creation of a "bipolar" world, and the inevitable
competition and conflict between Rome and Constantinople. Kupehan argues that a similar
disintegration of "the West" into two powers, the U.S. and the EU, will inevitably also result in
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extremely improbable, the international influence of the EU is likely to grow,
especially in the face of what is perceived in many parts of the world as
American arrogance and unilateralism.
U.S. and EU competition in trade and finance is also likely to increase,
especially as Europe begins to solve its productivity issues centering on its aging
population. Solutions include: expansion of the European workforce through
immigration reform; expansion of the EU to the east; and incorporation of
millions of younger and highly motivated workers from the former Soviet bloc
and perhaps the Middle East.
The United States and the European Union are also likely to compete rather
than cooperate over multilateral organizations, including the United Nations.
Europe's relation to the United Nations and other international organizations has
largely been supportive and positive. American views of such organizations
shift from benign neglect to outright hostility, as evidenced by the U.S. response
to the Kyoto Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and actions in Iraq. The
rest of the world may soon see a choice between perceived American arrogance
and unilateralism, and European internationalism and cooperation.
In what Charles A. Kupchan sees as a shift from a unipolar American-
dominated world to a bipolar U.S.-EU competitive system, there are few, if any,
competitors. The former Soviet bloc countries, including Russia, are either
rapidly aligning with the European Union or too weak to be very relevant in the
international system. Far on the horizon loom China and the rest of Asia, rapidly
developing as economic powers, but far from being competitive players in the
geopolitical arena of the twenty-first century. However, those nations present
the first faint glimpses of a new, multipolar balance of power system in the
distant future.
The European Constitution is an important step towards the creation of
Europe as a world power, but it is not an essential one. Europe is already a
strong player in the world system, through its integrated economy, the strength
of the euro, and the perception that it represents a more balanced and
internationalist focus than the U.S. It is likely that some form of constitution for
Europe will be adopted, if not during the current ratification process, then
certainly during the next few years. As political organizing principles, it will be
useful; as a rallying symbol and a foundation for European self-confidence and
future integration, it is essential.
The European Constitution has a long way to go, and the present version
may well be a false start. Almost certainly, Europe will have a constitution in
the near future, if not this version, one much like it. And, as the European courts
competition and conflict. He does not foresee the possibility of armed conflict, but rather
competition at the diplomatic, geopolitical and economic levels. Kupc-iAN, supra note 3, at 153-
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interpret the document, as scholars analyze specific provisions, as clarifying
amendments are passed and as the document achieves a level of acceptance and
veneration, it will form a context and organizing foundation for Europe as both a
political entity and an international force.

